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STATEMENT OF IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICUS
CURIAE
The Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality (“Center”) is
based at Seattle University School of Law and advances justice through
research, advocacy, and education. The Korematsu Center is dedicated to
advancing the legacy of Fred Korematsu, who defied the military orders
during World War II that ultimately led to the incarceration of over
110,000 Japanese Americans. He took his challenge to the military orders
to the United States Supreme Court, which upheld his conviction in 1944
on the ground that the removal of Japanese Americans was justified by
“military necessity.” Mr. Korematsu went on to successfully challenge his
conviction and to champion the cause of civil liberties and civil rights for
all people. The Korematsu Center, inspired by his example, works to
advance his legacy by promoting social justice. It has a special interest in
promoting fairness in the courts of our country. That interest includes
ensuring that effective remedies exist to address implicit and explicit bias in
the courtroom and in the criminal justice system at large. The Korematsu
Center does not, in this brief or otherwise, represent the official views of
Seattle University.
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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
When considered as a class,1 drug-detection dogs are often not
reliable informants. Empirical evidence demonstrates that drug-detection
dogs produce high rates of false positives, alerting their handlers to the
existence of odors associated with illicit substances despite the absence of
those illicit substances. Thus, as a class, drug-detection dogs would fail the
veracity or accuracy prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test, which requires the
warrant affidavit to demonstrate the informant’s basis of knowledge and
the veracity of that information. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S.
410, 89 S. Ct. 584, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S.
108, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964). Though federal courts no
longer follow Aguilar and Spinelli, Washington continues to adhere to this
standard. See State v. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d 432, 437, 688 P.2d 136 (1984).
Further empirical evidence demonstrates that drug-detection dogs
can be influenced by cues they intuit from their handlers. Drug-detection
dogs may provide alerts because of the handler’s belief that drugs might

1

Courts have considered the reliability of different classes of informants such as
anonymous tipsters, confidential informants, and citizen informants, in ascending order
of reliability. People v. McLaurin, 43 N.Y.2d 902, 905, 374 N.E.2d 614, 403 N.Y.S.2d
720 (1978) (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting) (anonymous tips are inherently unreliable);
Michael E. Rebell, The Undisclosed Informant and the Fourth Amendment: A Search for
Meaningful Standards, 81 Yale L.J. 703, 712-14 (1974) (confidential informants are
regarded as inherently suspect because of their anonymity); United States v. Harris, 403
U.S. 573, 599, 91 S. Ct. 2075, 29 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citizen
informant is most credible type of informant).
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be present, rather than the actual presence of drugs. The susceptibility of
drug-detection dogs to handler cues is made even more troubling when a
handler’s explicit or implicit bias might lead a drug-detection dog to
produce false positives when searching racial minorities. Though race is
not directly involved in this case, the Court should not turn a blind eye to
the fact that the legal rule that emerges from this case will impact the role
that race plays in our state’s criminal justice system.
Because drug-detection dogs give high rates of false positives and
are further susceptible to giving those false positives based on handler
cues—including false beliefs flowing from racial bias, explicit or
implicit—as a class, drug-detection dogs fail the basis of knowledge prong
of Aguilar-Spinelli. Amicus does not take the position that law
enforcement should not be able to employ drug-detecting dogs, but instead
urges that it is incumbent on both courts and law enforcement agencies to
better understand the problems with regard to drug-detection dog
reliability.
Therefore, given the privacy interests at stake, unless an exception
to the warrant requirement exists, a warrant should be required before law
enforcement conducts a dog sniff search of a person’s car. Further,
because drug-detection dogs as a class are not reliable, a drug dog’s alert
should not support issuance of a warrant unless particularized information
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is provided to the judicial officer that this particular drug-detection dog is
both sufficiently accurate and not susceptible to improper handler cues,
intentional or otherwise.
ARGUMENT
I.

Empirical Research Demonstrates that Drug-Detection Dogs
Frequently Give Unreliable Information, as Evidenced by High
Rates of Providing False Positives and Uncertain Rates of
False Negatives.
Drug-detection dogs frequently give false alerts, or “false

positives.” The circumstances in which a dog alerts—especially how long
it has been working that day—can radically affect the reliability of that
alert. A 2001 study cited by dog proponents to suggest the reliability of
dogs concludes that dogs issue false alarms between 12.5% and 60% of
the time in experimental conditions. Kelly J. Garner et al., Duty Cycle of
the Detector Dog: A Baseline Study 12 (2001), http://info.dsiiti.com/hsfs/hub/40565/file-14168106-pdf/docs/6-809_dutycycle_of_police_dog.pdf; see also Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S.
405, 412 ,125 S. Ct. 834, 160 L. Ed. 2d 842 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(criticizing Illinois’s reliance on this study as indicia of canine reliability).
The dogs involved in the study were specifically trained to work for long
periods to detect certain smells, or, in the jargon of the study, to work a
long “duty cycle.” Garner, supra at 6. Even these specially trained dogs’
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performance steadily deteriorated as they worked. After only two hours of
work, the dogs’ rate of false alarms spiked to 60%. Id. at 12. This study,
among other considerations, led Justice Souter to conclude that the
“infallible dog” is “a creature of legal fiction.” 543 U.S. at 411.
Other empirical literature confirms that false positive rates range
dramatically among dogs. While some dogs rarely err, having a false
positive rate cited by a court of only 8%, others are far more reactive, with
false positive rates determined by judges reaching rates of over 50%,
meaning one of every two alerts will be a false positive. Lewis R. Katz &
Aaron P. Golembiewski, Curbing the Dog: Extending Protection of the
Fourth Amendment to Police Drug Dogs, 85 Neb. L. Rev. 735, 757
(2007).
Further, empirical literature instructs that dogs’ highly sensitive
sense of smell can indicate a wide range of both legal and illegal
substances, contrary to the State’s assertion that a drug dog alert “only
discloses the presence or absence of contraband,” Br. of Resp’t at 10-11.
In some cases, dogs have been trained to alert to “generic forms of valium,
one of the most common prescribed forms of drugs in the United States.”
Katz & Golembiewski, supra, at 754. Likewise, dogs do not smell heroin
per se, but rather alert to the acetic acid in heroin, which is a common
substance also found in pickles and certain glues. Id. at 755. The chemical
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compound which a dog alerts to in cocaine, methyl benzoate, is found in
many legal products. Id. Although methyl benzoate is found in higher
concentrations in cocaine than in legal substances, the compound
dissipates quickly when exposed to the air and can dissipate into levels
consistent with legal products in a little over a week. Id at 756.
Because the empirical literature calls into question the ability of
drug-detection dogs to give accurate “tips,” information and context about
the individual dog’s track record should be at the core of the AguillarSpinelli veracity analysis. State v. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d 432, 437, 688 P.2d
136 (1984) (“The most common way to satisfy the ‘veracity’ prong is to
evaluate the informant’s ‘track record’, i.e., has he provided accurate
information to the police a number of times in the past?”). It would
undoubtedly be relevant if a 9-1-1 tipster had sent police on goose chases
before. The same is true for a dog that frequently gives false positives.
II.

Empirical Research Demonstrates that Drug-Detection Dogs
Are Influenced by Their Handlers, Tending to Give an Alert If
the Handler Suspects the Presence of Illicit Substances, Thus
Calling into Question Whether the Basis for the Alert Is the
Presence of Odors Associated with Illicit Substances or the
Handler’s Suspicions.
Dogs have “unusual skills” in interpreting human cues—what the

literature sometimes refers to as the “Clever Hans Effect.” Brian Hare et
al., The Domestication Hypothesis for Dogs’ Skills with Human
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Communication, 79 Animal Behav. e1, e6 (2010). Clever Hans, an Orlov
trotter horse, appeared to do math, tell time, and count people. Laasya
Samhita & Hans J. Gross, The “Clever Hans Phenomenon” Revisited, 6
Communicative & Integrative Biology 1, 1-2 (2013). This “thinking”
horse used his hooves to answer questions, captivating audiences and
receiving global attention in the early twentieth century. Id. Though not a
hoax, it turned out that Clever Hans was so adept at reading human cues
that he was able to provide correct answers in response to those cues, even
when he had never previously met the examiner and the examiner did not
consciously disclose the correct answers. Id. Clever Hans’s cleverness
stemmed from his ability to give humans what they implicitly wanted.
Human cues have a powerful impact on dog behavior. Scientists
have found that dogs respond to many types of human characteristics and
behaviors, including their handler’s gender, personality, eye movements,
gestures, posture, head orientation, proximity, and voice. Lisa Lit et al.,
Handler Beliefs Affect Scent Detection Dog Outcomes, 14 Animal
Cognition 387, 388 (2011) (citation omitted). Sometimes dogs trust
humans above and beyond their own senses. In one study, almost half of
dogs approached an empty bowl indicated by human pointing rather than a
bowl where the dog had already seen and smelled food. Id. at 388
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(citations omitted). Not only are dogs not neutral, but human cues can
override powerful sensory inputs—like food.
Dr. Lit’s recent double-blind study, Handler Beliefs Affect Scent
Detection Dog Outcomes, demonstrates that even trained police dogs
become more error-prone due to handler beliefs. Researchers at the
University of California, Davis, invited eighteen actual police dogs and
their handlers to participate in a study in which they would attempt to
detect the presence of contraband in four separate rooms, checking each
room twice, for a total of 144 searches (“runs”). Id. at 388-90.
Unbeknownst to the handlers, there was no contraband in any room, so
any dog alerts of contraband were false positives—alerts of contraband
when there was none. Id. at 389.2
In total, the handlers reported their dogs to have (erroneously)
alerted 225 times in total—an average of 12.5 times per dog. Id. at 390.3
Stated otherwise, the dogs alerted 85% (123 / 144) of the time when there
was no contraband present—a glaring error rate. Id. at 390. Moreover,

Each of the four rooms had four possible “conditions”: (1) control; (2) red paper
marker; (3) unmarked decoy scent (sausage and tennis ball); and (4) red paper marker at
the decoy scent. Id. at 389. Before the dogs inspected a room, the researchers instructed
their handlers that each condition might contain up to three target scents, and that target
scent markers consisting of a red piece of construction paper would be present in two
conditions. Id. at 389. In actuality, these red papers were decoys and there was no
contraband, but the handlers were none the wiser. Id.
3
Interestingly, the handlers were told that each of the four “conditions” (room) might
contain up to three target scents—for a total of 12 possible scents in an entire run.
2

8

false positives were especially prevalent when the handler held
preconceived notions about the presence of contraband—and inadvertently
cued his or her dog. Id. at 392-93. The dogs had 15 runs without alerting
in rooms without red paper, but only 6 runs without indicating in rooms
with red paper—over twice as many. Id. at 391.
The researchers reasoned that dog responses to human cues were
not surprising because “in training, alerts are originally elicited through
overt handler cuing” and “more subtle unintentional cues.” Id. at 394. The
experimenters were unsurprised that dogs, trained to alert based in part on
certain human cues, would do so in the field. Id. The researchers
concluded that human belief that scent was present negatively affected the
accuracy of the dogs:
The overwhelming number of incorrect alerts identified across
conditions confirms that handler beliefs affect performance.
Further, the directed pattern of alerts in conditions containing a
marker compared with the pattern of alerts in the condition with
unmarked decoy scent suggests that human influence on handler
beliefs affects alerts to a greater degree than dog influence on
handler beliefs.
Id. at 391 (emphasis added). This study undermines the State’s
characterization of police dogs as neutral and accurate.4

At least one court has cited the Lit et al. study to support its suggestion that “the time
might be right for a reevaluation of the proper training, certification, use and application
of the dog sniff as a tool of law enforcement and as a means to enable intrusion into
Fourth Amendment protected space.” United States v. One Million, Thirty-Two
4

9

III.

Lack of Reliability Becomes Even More Constitutionally
Infirm Under Article I, Section 7, Because Empirical Data
Demonstrates that Dog Sniff Searches of Racial Minorities
Produce Disproportionately High False Positive Rates When
Compared to Dog Sniff Searches of Whites.
Investigative reporters at the Chicago Tribune published an article

in 2011 analyzing three years of searches based on dog alerts conducted
by suburban police departments outside of Chicago. Dan Hinkel & Joe
Mahr, Drug Dogs Often Wrong, Chi. Trib., Jan 6, 2011. The reporters
found that only 44 percent of all alerts led to the discovery of drugs or
paraphernalia. Id. Critically, they found the dog sniff searches of Hispanic

Thousand, Nine Hundred Eighty Dollars in U.S. Currency, 855 F. Supp. 2d 678, 722
(N.D. Ohio 2012). The same court in a different case did not find the study persuasive,
criticizing the study for not employing a complete double-blind protocol. United States v.
Rhee, No. 3:12CR2, 2014 WL 2213079 at *4 (N.D. Ohio May 28, 2014). However, the
study employed the double-blind protocol to the extent possible, Lit et al., supra, at 390,
but of course could not be truly double blind because the researchers had to tell the
handlers that the red paper markers indicated possible presence of contraband to test the
hypothesis that handler belief affected whether the dog would alert.
Another court noted that “the conclusions of this study have not been unanimously
accepted[,]” United States v. Guyton, No. 11-271, 2013 WL 2394895 at *7-8 (E.D. La.
Apr. 16, 2013), citing as an example a responsive article that purported to identify a
number of flaws in the study. That two page article—self-published online and without
peer review—by the Scientific Working Group on Dog and Orthogonal Detector
Guidelines, criticized the study because (1) the dogs themselves were not tested in a
controlled blind setting before conducting the runs; (2) the researchers did not review the
canine teams’ previous training records and certification details; (3) the canines used
were trained to detect both drugs and explosives; (4) there was potential for
contamination of the testing areas; and (5) there was danger in extrapolating conclusions
from a small sample size to a larger population. Scientific Working Group on Dog and
Orthogonal Detector Guidelines (SWGDOG), SWGDOG Membership Commentary on
“Handler beliefs affect scent detection dog outcomes” by L. Lit, J.B. Schweitzer and A.M.
Oberbauer (Mar. 31 2011), http://swgdog.fiu.edu/news/2012/swgdog-response-to-lit-k9study/swgdog_response_to_lit_study.pdf. Dr. Lit’s study forthrightly acknowledged these
limitations but gave satisfactory explanations for why these issues did not confound the
results. See Lit et al., supra, at 393.
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drivers produced disproportionately high false positive rates: when the
data for Hispanic drivers was disaggregated, the success rate was just 27
percent.5 Id.6 Stated differently, drug-detection dogs had a false positive
rate of 56% overall and a 73% false positive rate when Hispanic motorists
were subjected to a dog sniff search.
After the Chicago Tribune article was published, a report by the
ACLU of Illinois confirmed that data collected on dog sniff searches
revealed that alerts were wrong as often as they were right, and that there
was “a substantial racial disparity in erroneous dog alerts.” ACLU of
Illinois, Racial Disparity in Consent Searches and Dog Sniff Searches, at
7 (Aug. 13, 2014), https://www.aclu-il.org/en/publications/racialdisparity-consent-searches-and-dog-sniff-searches. The report noted that
“Hispanic motorists were 2.16 times more likely than white motorists to
be subjected to a dog sniff search by ISP [Illinois State Patrol] troopers in

5

The success rate for Blacks was 46%, and for Caucasian 49%. Hinkel & Mahr, supra.
The article did not explain or otherwise hypothesize why the success rates for Blacks and
Hispanics differed so notably. See id. The Chicago Police Department did not report any
data. Id.
6
When the data was disaggregated for the individual departments who had the highest
numbers of total dog sniff searches, it showed more significant disparities in alert
accuracy as between Hispanic and non-Hispanic drivers. Hinkel & Mahr, supra.
McHenry County data showed that 32 percent of the 103 searches based on dog alerts led
to the finding of drugs or paraphernalia. Id. In the 8 searches on Hispanic drivers,
officers reported finding drugs just one time. Id. Naperville County data demonstrated
that 47 percent of searches turned up drugs or paraphernalia, with searches on Hispanic
drivers turning up drugs in only 1 of the 12 stops, for a rate of 8 percent. Id. The article
also noted that some of the false positives from the data set could have resulted from
presence of drug residue rather than any legally significant quantity of drugs. Id.
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2013.” Id. at 8. However, comparing white motorists and Hispanic
motorists who were subjected to dog sniff searches, white motorists were
64% more likely than Hispanic motorists to be found with contraband. Id.
It is plausible to surmise that the higher rate of false positives for Hispanic
drivers might stem at least in part from handler cues, especially when the
initial decision to conduct a dog sniff search may itself be the result of
bias, explicit or otherwise, on the part of either the handler, the other
officers who make the initial decision to deploy the dog, or both.
IV.

The Existence and Pervasiveness of Implicit Racial Bias Raise
Important Policy Considerations that Should Lead this Court to
Require a Warrant Before a Dog Sniff Search of a Car.
Washington Courts, as well as the Ninth Circuit, have come to

understand that all people harbor implicit biases—and handlers, who
might cue their dogs based on these biases, intentionally or
unintentionally, are no exception. See State v. Saintcalle, 178 Wn.2d 34,
46-49, 309 P.3d 326 (2013) (plurality opinion) (highlighting studies on
implicit racial bias and their importance in informing the debate about
reforming the peremptory challenge system);7 see also In re Marriage of
Black, 188 Wn.2d 114, 133-35, 392 P.3d 1041 (2017) (concluding that, in

7

The Court in City of Seattle v. Erickson, 188 Wn.2d 721, 398 P.3d 1124 (2017)
answered the call of Saintcalle to take a closer look at the Batson framework and adopted
a bright-line rule to address one particular aspect of peremptory challenges.
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a dissolution case, the guardian ad litem harbored bias against the
mother’s sexual orientation, and the trial court’s reliance on the biased
recommendations rendered portions of the parenting plan improper (citing
Saintcalle, 178 Wn.2d at 46)). The Ninth Circuit has recognized the effect
of implicit racial bias specifically in the Fourth Amendment traffic stop
context. Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS., 22 F.3d 1441, 1449-50 (9th Cir. 1994)
(determining a border patrol’s decision to stop a vehicle based on the fact
that the passengers appeared to be Hispanic was an egregious
constitutional violation requiring application of the exclusionary rule in
civil immigration proceeding, and noting that police “may use racial
stereotypes as a proxy for illegal conduct without being subjectively aware
of doing so.” (citing Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, The Ego, and Equal
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317,
322 (1987)).
Although Washington courts are familiar with implicit bias
scholarship, amicus provides the following sampling of studies of implicit

racial bias.8 Some of the most telling evidence of implicit aversive bias

8

While the studies summarized below focus on implicit bias against Blacks, it is
undisputed that implicit bias operates against other people of color, and more generally
against populations who both historically and currently suffer from discrimination. See,
e.g., Emily Ryo, On Normative Effects of Immigration Law, 13 Stan. J. C.R. & C.L. 95,
125-128 (2017) (discussing results of study of implicit bias against Latinos); Jerry Kang
et al., Are Ideal Litigators White? Measuring the Myth of Colorblindness, 7 J. Empirical
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emerges from experiments with the perception of black faces. See Jennifer
L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime and Visual Processing, 87
J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 876, 876 (2004). Studies show a strong
tendency to link the social category of black with concepts of crime. Id.
(citing studies). Eberhardt designed studies to further examine the
bidirectional nature of the link—i.e., “the association of Blacks with crime
renders objects relevant in the context of Black faces and Black faces
relevant in the context of crime.” Id. at 877. Eberhardt’s first study
demonstrated that when subjects were primed with 30-microsecond
images of black faces, and then shown a degraded and fuzzy image of a
gun, id. at 878-81, the “Black faces triggered a form of racialized seeing
that facilitated the processing of crime-relevant objects,” id. at 881.
Conversely, “exposure to White faces inhibited the detection of crimerelevant object.” Id. Eberhardt’s second study confirmed the hypothesis of
the bidirectional link between race and crime, revealing that “ostensibly
race-neutral concepts such as crime can become racialized. Not only are
Blacks thought of as criminal, but also crime is thought of as Black.” Id. at
883; see also Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer's Dilemma: Using

Legal Studies 886 (2010) (examining implicit bias against Asian Americans in the
litigation context).
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Ethnicity to Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J.
Personality & Soc. Psychol. 1314, 1325 (2002).
“In the policing context, implicit stereotypes can cause an officer
who harbors no conscious racial animosity and who rejects using race as a
proxy for criminality to unintentionally treat individuals differently based
solely upon their physical appearance.” L. Song Richardson, Arrest
Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 Minn. L. Rev. 2035, 2039
(2011). Therefore, “an officer might evaluate behaviors engaged in by
individuals who appear black as suspicious even as identical behavior by
those who appear white would go unnoticed.” Id.
The studies are not just important in the abstract—the problem of
racially discriminatory policing is well documented in Washington State,
including both Spokane and Seattle. Spokane is engaged in assessing the
problem of discriminatory policing.9 A recent report by a professor at
Eastern Washington University and the captain of the Spokane Police
Department found that Spokane police disproportionately stop black and
Native American residents, which in turn drives subsequent

9

Spokane is engaged in a Collaborative Reform Initiative with the Community Oriented
Policing Services of the U.S. Department of Justice. See Denise Rodriguez & Blake
McClelland, Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice,
Collaborative Reform Initiative, Sixth-Month Assessment Report on the Spokane Police
Department (2015), https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-w0789-pub.pdf.

15

disproportionalities in searches and arrests. Edward Byrnes & Brad Arleth,
Officer Contacts with Civilians and Race in the City of Spokane: A
Quantitative Analysis 1 (Mar. 17, 2015),
https://www.scribd.com/document/259193754/Civilian-Police-EncounterAnalysis-Spokane-Police-Department-Eastern-Washington-University.
The Department of Justice’s investigation of the Seattle Police
Department from 2011 raised “serious concerns about biased policing.”
U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division & United States
Attorney’s Office Western District of Washington, Investigation of the
Seattle Police Department (Dec. 16, 2011),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2011/12/16/spd_findl
etter_12-16-11.pdf. Even though these concerns fell short of a finding that
SPD engaged in a pattern or practice of discriminatory policing, id. at 3,
the DOJ ordered SPD to begin collecting data to better understand the
problem of discriminatory policing, id. at 40.
The Seattle Police Monitor report of June 2017 analyzed the stop
and frisk data collected since implementation of the consent decree.
Seattle Police Monitor, Tenth Systemic Assessment: Stops, Search, &
Seizure 3 (June 2017),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5425b9f0e4b0d66352331e0e/t/5947
3ca3b3db2bc40ddf8a6c/1497840805898/Dkt.+394--
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Stops+Assessment.pdf. While SPD is complying with the policy
requirements of stops, searches, and seizures, id. at 3, “the likelihood that
an individual will be stopped in the first instance and, when stopped, will
be frisked do vary substantially by and depend on race,” id. The report
further stated:
[R]acial disparity with respect to who is stopped and who is frisked
in Seattle cannot be easily explained in terms of underlying
societal or social disparities in crime, demographics, or
socioeconomic factors manifesting in neighborhood or geographic
trends. Even after incorporating those factors, an individual’s race
alone helps to predict the likelihood of being stopped and the
likelihood of being frisked by an SPD officer.
Id. at 4.
In the context of a dog sniff search, an officer’s implicit bias may
operate at two points—the initial decision to deploy the dog, and the
handler cues that may influence a dog’s issuance of an alert. Thus,
weaving together what Washington courts acknowledge about the
operation of implicit bias with studies establishing the “handler effect”
make it likely that a handler’s implicit racial bias—i.e., an officer’s
unstated, subconscious thought that people of color are more likely to have
contraband in their possession—will negatively affect canine reliability.
V.

Because the State Has Provided Insufficient Evidence that this
Dog Is Reliable and Not Susceptible to Handler Cues, the
“Tip” From this Dog Does Not Satisfy the Requirements
of Aguilar-Spinelli.
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The previous four sections have examined serious concerns about
the reliability of drug-detecting dogs as a class, and the State has failed to
acknowledge these reliability issues in Ms. Lares-Storms’s case. A police
dog’s indication of contraband is construed as a type of informant’s tip.
See Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 244, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 185 L. Ed. 2d
61 (2013). Washington applies the Aguilar-Spinelli two-pronged test when
evaluating the reliability of a tip. State v. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d 432, 435,
688 P.2d 136, 138 (1984). Under Washington’s test, the State must
demonstrate both the reliability of the tip and of the informant. Id.; Br. of
Appellant at 18-19. Here, the State did neither.
The State purports to meet these twin requirements—veracity and
basis of knowledge—by analogizing its dog to a tool. Its sources
characterize dogs as a “tool of law enforcement.” Br. of Resp’t at 10
(emphasis added). To the State, a dog’s nose “is comparable to a
flashlight,” a neutral tool that operates mechanically. Br. of Resp’t at 11.
The State gives evidence of the instant dog’s experience—400
applications and certification—but does not tell of performance—false
positives or the levels of contraband scents that will elicit an alert. Br. of
Resp’t at 13-14.10 Extensive certification, moreover, may make the dog

Indeed, the State admits that the dog detected “substances” or “odors.” Br. of
Respondent at 13. The State never clarifies if the detection of “odors” is in an
10
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more responsive to unintentional cues with handlers, as the research
suggests.
Moreover, training does not indicate talent. Justifying a dog’s
veracity based on its frequent interactions with law enforcement is akin to
justifying a human tipster’s veracity because she calls 9-1-1 often. The
Aguilar-Spinelli standard is not concerned with how often a police dog
alerts, but how those alerts can be verified to be true. Here, training might
just as well inculcate a dog to give frequent false positives, exacerbated by
human cues, than to indicate contraband accurately.
CONCLUSION
The empirical data reveal two important problems with the use of
drug-detection dogs—first that they often give high rates of false
positives, and second that they are susceptible to improper human cues. In
light of these problems described in the empirical literature, and
considering the strong privacy interests at stake in this case, this Court
should require a warrant before police may conduct a dog sniff search of a
car. Further, this Court should give clear guidance to judicial officers with
regard to the particularized information the state must provide to them in
order to satisfy the requirements of Aguilar-Spinelli.

experimental setting or if the handler just presumed the dog to be accurate in a field
setting, despite no verification of the presence of any contraband or odor of contraband.
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